The paper reports on a within-subject experiment, with substantial monetary incentives, designed to test wether or not people are risk-vulnerable. In the experiment, subjects face a simple portfolio choice problem in which they have to invest part of their wealth in a safe and a risky asset. We elicit risk vulnerability by observing each subject's portfolio choice in two di¤erent contexts that only di¤er by the presence of a signi…cant but actuarially neutral background risk. We …nd that most subjects, 78:3%, are risk-vulnerable. Precisely, 52:6% have invested less in the risky asset when exposed to background risk and 25:7% were indi¤erent. Thus only 21:7% of the subjects have invested strictly more in the risky asset when exposed to background risk.
I. Introduction
Most individuals are exposed to several risks simultaneously. While for some risks individuals can choose their preferred level, there are other risks to which individuals are simply exposed without control, i.e. risks that are non-diversi…able and/or non-insurable. The fundamental implication of this fact is that there is no risk-free situation for individuals. Di-versi…cation is limited because of systematic risk. Economic ‡uctuations caused by natural disasters, nuclear hazards, …nancial crisis, wars or popular uprisings, cannot be fully insured.
Furthermore, because of informational asymmetries, non-transferability and/or transaction costs, there exists many idiosyncratic risks for which full insurance is unfeasible. In any event, some risks remain necessarily in the background. All such committed but unresolved risks constitute what is usually called the 'background risk'.
Depending on the structure of individuals'preferences, the presence of background risk may lead to more or less cautious behavior, impacting thereby the price of risk in the economy.
Taking into account the background risk to which individuals are exposed can signi…cantly improve our understanding of risk-taking behavior in many economic contexts. Examples include the demand for insurance (Doherty and Schlesinger, 1983; Eeckhoudt and Kimball, 1992) , portfolio choices and asset prices (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Weil, 1992; Finkelshtain and Chalfant, 1993; Franke, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1998, 2004; Heaton and Lucas, 1997, 2000) , and e¢ cient risk-sharing (Gollier, 1996; Dana and Scarsini, 2007) .
The fundamental conjecture upon which this literature rests is that risk-averse agents consider independent risks as substitutes rather than as complements. According to Gollier and Pratt (1996, p. 1109) : "Conventional wisdom suggests that independent risks are substitutes for each other. In particular, adding a mean-zero background risk to wealth should increase risk aversion to other independent risks. However, risk aversion is not su¢ cient to guarantee this". Hence, relying on von Neuman and Morgenstern (1944)'s expected utility theory (EU ), Gollier and Pratt (1996) identi…ed 'risk vulnerability'as the weakest restriction to impose on the Bernoulli utility function of a decreasingly risk-averse individual to guarantee that he/she would behave in a more cautious way if an actuarially neutral background risk is added to his/her initial wealth, be it random or not (see Gollier and Pratt, 1996 , Proposition 2 and 4, p. 1112 and p. 1120 . Since the seminal contribution of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971) , it is well-known that the absolute risk aversion function governs the risk-taking behavior of individuals with EU preferences. Therefore, the comparativestatic properties of RV are derived directly from the standard comparative-static properties of 'comparative risk-aversion' (Pratt, 1964, Theorem 1, p. 128) .
In the framework of EU, RV …ts nicely to commonly accepted restrictions that have important and desirable comparative statics properties: risk vulnerability implies decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and is a consequence of more general notions of risk-aversion such as proper risk aversion (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987) and standard risk aversion (Kimball, 1993) . 1 Since risk vulnerability is necessary to obtain desirable static-comparative properties in many economic contexts, the question of wether or not most individual's behavior actually exhibits risk vulnerability is of paramount interest for economic analysis under EU. 2 But the empirical relevance of the risk vulnerability conjecture is beyond the scope of EU theory as it is a relevant issue for any decision-theoretic setting. In contrast with EU, Quiggin (2003) showed that for the wide class of risk-averse generalized expected utility preferences exhibiting constant risk aversion in the sense of Safra and Segal (1998) and Quiggin and Chambers (1998) , independent risks are actually complementary. 3 An individual with such preferences who is exposed to background risk would therefore contradict the risk vulnerability conjecture by behaving in a more cautious way.
Since alternative theories have di¤erent predictions about the impact of background risk on risk-taking behavior, there is a need for empirical evidence about risk vulnerability in order to contrast predictions with data. In this paper we provide experimental evidence about the impact of an actuarially neutral background risk on individuals'risk-taking behavior, i.e. we question whether people are risk-vulnerable?
To the best of our knowledge few studies have attempted to answer this question. Using naturally occurring data, Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996) found that investment in risky …nancial assets responds negatively to income risk, and Guiso and Paiella (2008) showed that individuals who are more likely to face income uncertainty or to become liquidity constrained exhibit a higher degree of absolute risk aversion.
Based on a framed …eld experiment Harrison, List and Towe (2007) found strong evidence in favor of risk vulnerability for numismatists. They relied on Holt and Laury (2002) 's multiple price list methodology to elicit traders' relative risk aversion (CRRA parameter) under three alternative incentives: monetary prizes, graded coins, and ungraded coins which entailed background risk. Their estimates show that using ungraded coins in the lotteries increases sharply the level of risk-aversion of coin traders compared to the conditions where monetary prizes or graded coins were used 4 . They suggest that it would be worth to explore further the extent of their empirical …ndings on the basis of a controlled laboratory experiment aiming at isolating the impact of background risk on risk-taking behavior. Lee (2008) reports experimental …ndings from a laboratory experiment whose aim was to compare the random round payo¤ mechanism (RRPM ) to a system where all rounds are being paid, the accumulated payo¤ mechanism (APM ). In each round subjects had to perform two tasks: task 1 was a risk-taking decision for which subjects had to trade o¤ a higher (lower) probability of winning for a lower (higher) prize. Task 2 was identical except that the event of winning was not determined by a chance event but by the choice made by an opponent player. According to the author the RRPM entails background risk because the subject has to take his decision for task 1 without knowing the outcome of task 2 ,while in the APM treatment the subject knows his accumulated wealth for task 1 and task 2. The main …nding is that risk-averse subjects tend to behave in a more cautious way under RPPM than under APM. But the data is scarce and the results are not clear-cut.
Our study is more closely related to Lusk and Coble (2008) who designed explicitly a laboratory experiment to test the risk vulnerability conjecture. Their experiment involved aversion based on Holt and Laury (2002) 's method in a between-subject design: 50 subjects faced no background risk, 27 subjects faced a zero-mean background risk $10; 1 2 ; $10; 1 2 and 53 subjects faced an unfair background risk $10; 1 2 ; $0; 1 2 . The impact of background risk on risk aversion is measured by comparing subjects'number of safe choices across treatments. The authors found weak evidence of risk vulnerability: the median number of safe choices is identical in the three treatments (6 safe choices) and a slightly greater number of safe choices was observed in the zero-mean and unfair background risk treatments (5:89 and 5:68 safe choices, respectively) compared with the no background risk treatment (5:40 safe choices). 5
In the present paper, we rely on a within-subject analysis and we use a di¤erent method to elicit subjects'risk-aversion. Instead of relying on Holt and Laury (2002) 's procedure, we adopt the simpler method proposed by Gneezy & Potters (1997) and Charness & Gneezy (2010) which relies on a standard portfolio choice problem in which the investor has to allocate his wealth between a safe and a risky asset. The safe asset secures the amount invested whereas the risky asset is a binary lottery which involves a random rate of return k = 0; 1 2 ; 3; 1 2 . In case of failure the return takes value 0 (the amount invested is lost) and in case of success the return takes value 3 (the amount invested is tripled). Failure and success are equally likely.
We report on two experiments, labelled Exp.1 and Exp.2, both of which rely on basically the same portfolio choice problem. However, to allow for robustness check, we deliberately varied many aspects between the two experiments. Exp.1 was run as a paper and pencil session involving 82 subjects while Exp.2 was a computerized experiment involving 167 subjects. In both experiments each subject faced the portfolio choice task described above.
In Exp.2, preliminary to the portfolio choice task, subjects had to work in order to accumulate wealth (e20) by performing a boring task. In contrast, in Exp.1 subjects' wealth was a windfall endowment (e100) provided by the experimenter. In Exp.1 which involved high stakes, only 10% of the participants (randomly selected) were paid out for real. In contrast, in Exp.2 where stakes were much lower, all participants were paid according to their earnings.
Despite these di¤erences, we show that the results of the two experiments are almost exactly the same.
In both experiments, half of each subject's wealth was in a blocked account while the other half was available for the portfolio choice task. Moreover, each subject faced the portfolio choice task twice, in two di¤erent situations labelled situation A and situation B. Situation A involved no background risk. In situation B the investor had to face an independent additive and actuarially neutral background risk e y = ( y; 1 2 ; y; 1 2 ) on his blocked account. We chose the level of background risk such that subjects could eventually loose their whole wealth in the blocked account, i.e. y = e50 in Exp.1 or y = e10 in Exp.2. Since the two situations A and B di¤er only by the presence or absence of a background risk, we unambiguously elicit RV by comparing for each subject his investment decision in situation A and in situation B. We control for a possible order e¤ect by randomizing the sequence of situations: in each experiment half of the subjects faced situation A …rst, while the other half faced situation B …rst. Our results were not a¤ected by the ordering of the treatments.
Our main …nding is that 78:3% of our 249 subjects exhibit RV. Precisely, 52:6% of the subjects invested a strictly lower amount in the risky asset when exposed to background risk while 25:7% were indi¤erent. Only 21:7% of the subjects behaved in a less cautious way when exposed to background risk.
We contrast our experimental data with respect to the predictions of EU, Quiggin (1982)'s rank dependent utility theory (RDU ), Yaari (1987) 's dual theory (DT ) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992)'s cumulative prospect theory (CPT ). These theories have contrasted predictions about the impact of background risk. in particular we show that DT predicts a more risky portfolio choice in the presence of background risk and, accordingly, that RDU can predict either more or less risky behavior. Predicting the behavior of a CPT -investor raises serious and previously unmentioned di¢ culties, even for the simple portfolio choice problem discussed in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and provides the theoretical foundation for our elicitation procedure of risk vulnerability. Section 3 presents the predictions for our portfolio choice problem under various choice theories: EU, DT, RDU and CPT. Our experimental …ndings are reported in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
II. Portfolio choice and risk vulnerability
In the experiment subjects faced a simple portfolio choice problem in two situations, labelled situation A and situation B. Situation B only di¤ered from situation A by the presence of an actuarially neutral background risk. We elicit RV by comparing each subject's investment decision with and without background risk. The theoretical framework described below fully mirrors our artefactual experiment.
We assume an investor with initial wealth level x > 0, half of which is in a blocked account. The other half can be allocated between a safe asset which secures the amount invested and a risky asset with a binary random rate of return e k = 0; 1 2 ; 3; 1 2 . We …rst consider the problem without background risk. Letting 2 [0; 1] be the fraction of 1 2 x invested in the risky asset, the endogenous discret probability distribution of the investor's wealth is written e
x are the wealth levels in case of failure ( e k = 0) and success ( e k = 3) of the risky investment, respectively.
We assume that the investor maximizes a general preferences function v( ) de…ned over random wealth e
x. Without background risk, the optimal portfolio is given by
Now suppose that the agent is forced to bear an independent additive and actuarially neutral background risk e y = ( y; 1 2 ; y; 1 2 ) on his blocked account. In the experiment, we chose the level of background risk such that y = 1 2 x, i.e. subjects could eventually loose their wealth in the blocked account 6 . Under background risk the random wealth of the agent becomes e x + e y = x 11 ; 1 4 ; x 21 ; 1 4 ; x 12 ; 1 4 ; x 22 ; 1 4 , where x i1 = x i y and x i2 = x i + y for i = 1; 2. The optimal portfolio is now given by
In our framework, risk vulnerability means that B
A . An individual is risk-vulnerable if he/she chooses a less risky portfolio when he/she moves from situation A to situation B and conversely. De…nition 1 below characterizes all the possible types an individual may exhibit:
III. Theoretical predictions and numerical results
The preferences function v ( ) can take various forms depending on the behavioral assumption (EU, DT, RDU or CPT ). While predicting the impact of background risk within the EU framework is rather straightforward, the task becomes rather unobvious under alternative behavioral assumptions, even for the simple portfolio choice problem that we considered in our experiment. To the best of our knowledge, outside EU, there are surprisingly no theoretical results regarding the impact of background risk on portfolio choice. We illustrate, using our parametrized portfolio choice problem, that under conventional and/or empirically founded assumptions, alternative theories have opposite predictions. Moreover under CPT background risk a¤ects the reference point in an ambiguous way, which raises a methodological issue that has not yet been addressed. We consider successively the predictions under EU, DT, RDU and CPT.
A. Expected utility theory
Under EU, the preferences function is linear in probability and takes the following form:
v
where u is a strictly increasing (u 0 > 0) and concave (u 00 < 0) real-valued Bernoulli utility function de…ned over …nal wealth. Following previous literature (Kihlstrom and al., 1981; Nachman, 1982; Pratt, 1988; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987; Gollier and Pratt, 1996) 
The Kuhn-Tucker …rst-order conditions for situation A yield:
Substituting U for u gives the analogous conditions in the presence of background risk, i.e. for situation B. Since x 1 x 2 for any level of investment, it is apparent from (5) that risk-loving and risk-neutral agents (with nondecreasing marginal utility) both choose the maximum possible investment, and that a zero investment cannot be an optimal choice under monotonic preferences. Moreover, observe that the optimal investment is a decreasing function of the ratio of marginal utilities, and that this ratio cannot be smaller than one under risk aversion. In addition, it cannot decrease as the individual becomes more risk-averse. Indeed, as observed by Pratt (1988, eq. 2, p. 398) , U is at least as risk-averse than u if and only if U 0 (x 1 )
u 0 (x 2 ) for x 1 x 2 . According to (5), this suggests that if U is at least as risk-averse than u, that is if u is risk-vulnerable, then A B . Gollier and Pratt (1996, Def. 1, p.1112 ) equivalently de…ned risk vulnerability as the assumption that the background risk increases the individual's absolute risk aversion function:
Thus, the Arrow-Pratt framework of comparative risk aversion fully applies as if u and U corresponded to the preferences of two di¤erent individuals. In particular the following well-known result applies (see Pratt, 1964, Theorem 1, p. 128; Gollier and Pratt, 1996, Proposition 1, p. 1112) .
Proposition 2. Under EU the following statements are equivalent:
The individual is risk-vulnerable [strictly-risk-vulnerable, indi¤erent, non-risk-vulnerable].
As mentioned by Gollier and Pratt (1996) , all commonly used Bernoulli utility functions exhibiting (non-increasing) harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA) exhibit risk vulnerability. Under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), the introduction of an additive background risk has obviously no impact on absolute risk aversion. Therefore individuals with CARA preferences are indi¤erent to the introduction of an additive background risk.
On the other hand, under DARA, it is easy to show that the individual is here strictly-riskvulnerable if:
Under monotonic and risk-averse preferences, the ratio of marginal utilities in the r.h.s. of the inequality in (7) is strictly smaller than one. Therefore a su¢ cient condition for (7) to hold is that the ratio of changes in absolute risk aversion in the left hand side of the inequality in (7) is greater than one. Since the numerator (resp. denominator) of this latter ratio is the increase in absolute risk aversion due to a loss of y at wealth level x (resp.
x + y), it follows that decreasing and convex absolute risk aversion is a su¢ cient condition for risk vulnerability, as observed by Gollier and Pratt (1996) .
To illustrate, consider the widely used power utility function exhibiting constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) with parameter :
The predicted impact of background risk on the portfolio choice is illustrated for a plausible range of the CRRA parameter (e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002) in Figure 1 . As the CRRA parameter increases, the optimal investment curve is …rst horizontal and then becomes strictly decreasing and convex. In the presence of background risk the curve simply translates to the left since, under risk vulnerability, the background risk increases risk aversion. The model also predicts stronger absolute falls in investment for weakly risk-averse agents (the di¤erence A B is decreasing and convex in ). This property …ts nicely to our experimental data.
B. Dual theory
Suppose now that the individual behaves according to DT. Under DT, the preferences function is linear in monetary outcomes (rather than in probabilities as in EU ). With no loss of generality, outcomes are ordered (from the smallest to the largest). Without background risk, only two outcomes, x 1 and x 2 , are possible with x 1 < x 2 for A > 0 and x 1 = x 2 for A = 0. Furthermore, the cumulative distribution function F e x (x) = Pr (e x x) is distorted by a weighting function w : [0; 1] ! [0; 1], with w (0) = 0 and w (1) = 1. The weight attributed to wealth x i is written:
Thus, the preferences function takes the following form:
where (x 1 ) = w 1 2 and (x 2 ) = 1 w 1 2 . Since the preferences function is linear in , the optimal investment is typically a corner solution, i.e. A = 0 or A = 1. It follows that DT -investors exhibit 'plunging'behavior: they stay put until plunging becomes justi…ed (as observed by Yaari, 1987) :
Thus, the investors' behavior is fully determined by the value of w 1 2 , i.e. the distorted probability assigned to an unsuccessful investment. If the individual is optimistic or (not too much) pessimistic with w 1 2 < 2 3 then he/she chooses the maximum possible investment and, on the other hand, if the individual is strongly pessimistic with w 1 2 > 2 3 then he/she chooses the minimum possible investment.
In situation B there are four possible outcomes the ordering of which depends on B :
The probability weight attributed to wealth x ij is
The preferences function is then:
In the presence of background risk, the optimal portfolio is as follows: 8 B = 8 > > > > > > > > > > < > > > > > > > > > > :
Whenever w 1 2 < 2 3 , DT predicts A = B = 1. Observe that, if w 1 2 = 2 3 then A 2 [0; 1] and B 2 2 3 ; 1 . This suggests that a DT -investor cannot be strictly-risk-vulnerable. Let us illustrate with the simple power weighting function used in Safra and Segal (2008) :
This function is strictly concave (resp. convex) for < 1 (resp.
> 1), so that relatively more (resp. less) weight is given to probabilities associated to bad outcomes. Thus, if < 1 (resp. > 1), the individual is 'pessimistic' (resp. 'optimistic'. The predicted impact of background risk on the portfolio choice of the DT -investor is illustrated in Figure 2 . C. Rank-dependent utility theory
Both EU and DT are special cases of RDU. The preferences function takes therefore the following form:
and the Kuhn-Tucker …rst-order conditions for situation A yield:
where o, for p > 0 and 0 < 1.
Using = 0:65 we have w 1 2 = 0:45 < 1 2 . The smaller is the weighting function parameter , the smaller is the probability assigned to an unsuccessful investment in the risky asset.
Thus, optimism (small ) moderates risk aversion (high ), but the results are qualitatively the same than under EU : the optimal investment curve is …rst horizontal, for small values of and then becomes a strictly decreasing and convex function 9 . This is illustrated in Figure   3 below. In situation B the preferences function is written 10 :
Because the ranking of outcomes is endogeneous (it depends on the level of investment), the Kuhn-Tucker …rst-order conditions are quite complicated (as under EU ). To illustrate we rely on a numerical example. We choose = 0:65, which yields: (x 11 ) = 0:29, (x 22 ) = 0:36, It is interesting to note that overweighted probabilities (x 11 ) and (x 22 ) are associated with an outcome that combine 'bad with bad'and 'good with good', respectively. Indeed, (x 11 ) (resp. (x 22 )) is the probability assigned to an unsuccessful (resp. successful) investment in the risky asset and a defavorable (resp. favorable) realization of the background risk. On the other hand, underweighted probabilities (x 12 ) and (x 21 ) are both associated with an outcome that combine 'bad with good'. Indeed, (x 21 ) (resp. (x 12 )) is the probability assigned to a successful (resp. unsuccessful) investment in the risky asset and a defavorable (resp. favorable) realization of the background risk. The impact of background risk on the portfolio choice is illustrated in Figure 4 . In our numerical example the impact of background risk is stronger under RDU than under EU. This is so because without background risk the individual is more optimistic under RDU than under EU, whereas in the presence of background risk the individual is more pessimistic under RDU than under EU. This is can be viewed by observing Figure 3 and Figure 5 below. 
D. Cumulative Prospect Theory
Under CPT the transformation function is the same as in RDU, but since asset integration does not apply, the carriers of value are not the …nal net wealth positions but the variations of wealth with respect to a reference point x . This is captured by the value function introduced by Tversky & Kahneman (1992) that is de…ned over gains and losses (above and below the reference point):
where u (x ) = u (0) = u + (0) = 0, 0 < < < 1 and > 1. The value function is increasing, concave for gains and convex for losses 11 . Without background risk the reference point is clearly the initial wealth x, which is also the sure level of wealth that is obtained if the individual chooses to invest A = 0 in the risky asset (maximin). With this assumption,
we have x 1 = x = x 2 () A = 0, and x 1 < x < x 2 () 0 < A 1.
A second feature of CPT is that the probability weighting function also di¤ers above and below the reference point. The probability weighting function is de…ned over the cumulative distribution function for losses
and over the decumulative distribution function for gains
Thus, we have (x 1 ) = w 1 2 and + (x 2 ) = w + 1 2 and the preferences function takes the following form:
where X 1 = x x 1 = 1 2 x and X 2 = x 2 x = x. 12 Using u + (X) = X and u (X) = X , where 0 < < < 1 and > 1, we have
With background risk, it is unclear what the reference point might be. If we take the same de…nition than without background risk, i.e. the level of wealth that can be reached by the agent if he invests B = 0 in the risky asset, there are two possible candidates :
x i1 = 1 2 x and x i2 = 3 2 x. Taking 3 2 x as the reference point under background risk can be interpreted as if the agent adopted an optimistic view about the outcome of the background risk, while if 1 2 x is the reference point, the interpretation would be that the agent adopts a pessimistic view about the outcome of the background risk. Note that the optimistic and pessimistic reference points are respectively above and below the reference point without background risk, i.e. 1 2 x < x < 3 2 x. Observe that a reference point at x with background risk, i.e. insensitivity to the background risk, is another possibility but seems to us rather inconsistent with CPT.
In the presence of a background risk the derivation of Kuhn-Tucker …rst-order conditions for optimal portfolio choice is a particularly tedious task under CPT. Thus it is developed in an appendix.
Just note that in the case of a pessimistic reference point, i.e. 1 2 x, the possible gains and losses are:
The probability weights are given by (X ij ) = w (Pr (e x x ij )) w (Pr (e x < x ij )) for losses and by
for gains. 13 Thus, the preference functional takes the following form:
On the other hand, in the case of a optimistic reference point, 3 2 x, the possible gains and losses are:
Thus, the preference functional takes the following form:
To illustrate we use Prelec (1998)'s probability weighting function (18) We also consider three cases for parameters characterizing the value function, i.e. , and . The results are summarized below.
Optimal portfolio predicted by CPT x = 20; = 0:65; + = 0:5
Case a. f = 0:2; = 0:40; = 1:00g 0:51% 0:01% strictly RV i.e. x = 1 2 x, the optimal investment is even weaker, and the individual behavior exhibits RV. On the contrary, with a optimistic reference point in the presence of background risk, i.e. x = 3 2 x, the optimal investment is full investment. Thus, depending on the reference point chosen in the presence of background risk, CPT may predict risk vulnerability or not.
Here, predictions under CPT are quite similar to the ones obtained under DT. Thus, as DT, CPT is here hardly able to explain our experimental data.
IV. Experimental method and design
Our experimental design follows closely the theoretical framework described in section IV. A total of 279 student-subjects participated in our experiments. Participants were randomly selected from a large pool of over 3000 volunteers. Real monetary incentives were o¤ered to all participants. Two di¤erent experiments based on a within-subject design were organized: a paper & pencil experiment (Exp.1 ) and a computerized experiment (Exp.2 ).
Besides the experimental "technology", Exp.1 and Exp.2 di¤er on several key aspects: the incentive scheme, the subjects'endowments, the level of stakes and the subject pool. Exp.1 involved 91 …rst year master students in economics belonging to the same group. "High stakes" were used (participants could win up to e250) but only 10% of the participants were randomly selected at the end of the experiment to be paid out for real. Finally in Exp.1 participants could invest a windfall money endowment provided by the experimenter.
Exp.2 involved 188 participants randomly selected from a large subject pool of over 3000 volunteers from various disciplines. All participants were paid according to their earnings in the experiment, but stakes were much lower than in experiment 1 (the maximum was e50).
Finally, participants had to "work" in a preliminary task to earn a money endowment of e20 that they could invest in a risky asset in the active part of the experiment. More details will be provided in the description of each experiment.
We chose to vary simultaneously several aspects of the portfolio task that are irrelevant from a theoretical perspective (except for the level of endowment) in order to check the robustness of our initial …ndings in Exp.1. Since many reasons could explain subjects'observed behavior in Exp.1 (windfall money, random selection, participants' major, ...) Exp.2 provides a strong test of the robustness of our …ndings in Exp.1. A translation of the instructions can be found in appendix 1.
A. Experiment 1
Exp.1 was a single session involving 91 …rst-year master students majoring in economics.
Subjects were seated in a large room with numbered seats clearly separated and chose one of the numbered seats as they entered the room. Written instructions were available on each place, and participants were instructed to read them silently once seated. Once all participants had read the instructions, they were read again aloud by one of the assistants present in the room. Instructions speci…ed that each participant had a potential endowment of w =e100 which was equally split between two independent accounts: account 1 and account 2. The decision task corresponded to the portfolio choice problem described in section II. Subjects were told that account 1 was blocked. They could only use their endowment in account 2, containing x =e50, for making the investment decision. Participants had to decide about their investment into the risky option by choosing an integer amount between e0 and e50: thus, 2 f0; 2%; 4%; :::; 100%g. They had to answer the same questions in two situations (A and B) presented sequentially. Half of the participants had to answer situation A before situation B, while the other half was confronted to the reverse ordering. Situation B involved background risk e
x 1 = ( e50; 1 2 ;e50; 1 2 ) for account 1: e50 would be added or substracted from account 1 with equal probability, after the respondent made his investment decision for account 2. It was made clear that only one of the two situations would apply for real at the end of the experiment, the choice of the relevant situation being decided on a random basis. Furthermore, subjects were told that 10% of the participants would be ran-domly selected (by choosing randomly 10% of the numbered seats) to be paid out for real a the end of the session.
B. Experiment 2
Exp. 2 involved 188 participants and di¤ered in many aspects from Exp.1. The experiment followed a two-stage procedure. In the …rst stage of the experiment, each subject can accumulate real money by accomplishing a simple, but tedious task during a limited period of time. The task consisted in reporting the number of times number "1" appeared in a matrix containing strings of "0"'s and "1"'s. Ten di¤erent matrixes with varying sizes had to counted this way. A substantial reward of e20 was paid for accomplishing the task without error. At the end of the …rst stage only subjects who had completed the task correctly for all ten matrixes received the ‡at reward of e20. Only 18 participants out of 188 (8; 5%) failed to accomplish the task in time and/or without error. They were instructed that they could stay in the experiment until the end, but that they would play with …ctitious money. Those who succeeded were instructed that they could use their earning from stage 1 to participate in second stage decisions. The reason for including this …rst stage was to control for a windfall money e¤ect that could have a¤ected the results of Exp.1.
At the end of the …rst stage participants were informed that their x =e20 reward would be split into two identical parts, credited on two separate personal accounts (account 1 and account 2) and that they would receive in cash the balance of both accounts at the end of the session.
In the second step of the experiment subjects were told that they could use the 1 2 x =e10 of their account 2 for making an investment decision. The investment decision corresponded to the portfolio choice problem described in section 2 with 1 2 x = e10. Investment choice possibilities in the risky asset were restricted to integer amounts between e0 and e10. Thus in contrast to Exp.1 there where fewer choice options for 2 f0; 10%; 20%; :::; 1g. As in Exp.1, in the second stage subjects were informed that they would be asked to choose in two distinct situations labelled A and B, where situation B involved background risk e y = ( 10; 1 2 ; 10; 1 2 ) for account 1. Therefore depending on the realized outcome the balance of account 1 is either 0e or 20e. Subjects were told that at the end of the experiment one of the two situations would be chosen randomly to be paid out for real. To control for order e¤ects half of the participants were assigned to situation A …rst, and the other half to situation B …rst.
One can argue that since we used the RRPM procedure, i.e. only one of the two situations (A or B) was randomly selected to be paid our for real, through a coin toss in both experiments and, in addition, only some of the participants were randomly selected to be paid out for real in Exp. 1 -we actually induced a second background risk, as in Lee (2008)'s experiment. Even if this is true, it does not a¤ect our conclusion because of our withinsubject design. Such additional implemented background risk simply adds to the subjects' own background risk that they bring with them to the lab and which we do not control.
With the exception of the order e¤ect, the impact of background risk is therefore captured all other things equal in our experiment. Note also that under EUT, Gollier and Pratt (1996) have demonstrated that RV is necessary and su¢ cient for an increase in background risk to generate more risk aversion, if it takes the form of adding an independent actuarially neutral risk to the background random wealth, as in our experiment.
V. Data analysis and results
We rely on two categorizations: a "coarse" categorization which distinguishes between RV and Non-RV individuals and a "…ne" categorization that adds a further distinction within the RV category between the strict-RV and the Indi¤erent individuals. We start by providing descriptive statistics about relative frequencies for each category. We next provide estimates for RV based on regression analysis.
A. Descriptive results
Among the 279 subjects, 10 have chosen A = B = 0 and 20 have chosen A = B = 1 14 .
Such extreme investment decisions are consistent with Indi¤erence, Strict-RV and Non-RV.
For instance a subject for whom A = B = 1, could have preferred A > B = 1 but faced a binding constrain for his investment decision in situation A. Likewise a subject for whom A = B = 0, could have preferred A = 0 > B but was censured at zero investment. In order to avoid an ambiguous categorization of our subjects we drop these 30 observations for the descriptive analysis. 15 Table 1 summarizes the results of our categorization for the pooled data of the two experiments. 78:3% of the subjects invested an equal or lower amount in the risky asset in situation B and are therefore classi…ed as RV for the coarse categorization, while 21:7%
are Non-RV, i.e. A < B . According to the …ne categorization 52:6% are Strict-RV, i.e. they invested strictly less in situation B than in situation A ( A > B ), while 25:7% are Indi¤erent, i.e. A = B . Our main result is therefore that the relative frequency of RV individuals is signi…cantly larger than 50% (binomial test, 5%) in both experiments and for both treatments. Strict-RV
Non-RV
78:3%
(n = 195)
52:6%
(n = 131)
25:7%
(n = 64)
21:7%
(n = 54) Table 3 which compares the frequency of types according to the ordering of the investment decisions (treatment AB vs BA) for the pooled data. It is apparent that there is no order e¤ect. The frequency of RV and Non-RV is exactly the same for the two orderings. There is however a slight di¤erence in the frequencies of Strict-RV and Indi¤erent. Strict-RV
Exp.1 (n = 82)
78:0%
57:3%
(n = 47)
20:7%
(n = 17)
22:0%
(n = 18)
Exp.2 (n = 167)
78:4%
50:3%
(n = 84)
28:1%
21:6%
(n = 36) While the relative frequency of indi¤erent individuals is equal in both treatments and in both experiments (Fisher exact test, 5%), there exists a small di¤erence among the RV with respect to the frequency of Strict-RV vs Indi¤erent individuals. We think that this di¤erence is essentially due to the fact that the choice-space is richer in the classroom experiment than in the laboratory experiment. It is indeed conceivable that, in the laboratory experiment, some subjects would have been willing to reduce slightly their investment in situation B, for instance by 5%, but since such an option was not feasible (the minimum reduction possibility was 10%) they …nally kept their investment at the same level as in situation A. A striking result is that the frequency of Non-RV is exactly the same in both experiments, a result that suggests that the richer choice-space of Exp.1 only a¤ected the frequency of indi¤erent subjects with respect to the …ne categorization.
B. Analytical results
We …rst look at the determinants of the amount invested without background risk ( A ), which we interpret as a measure of risk-tolerance. We next study the variables that a¤ect the probability for a subject to be risk-vulnerable. We next study the variables that a¤ect the probability for a subject to be risk-vulnerable. Table 5 shows that the only signi…cant variable is A : the larger A the higher the probability for an individual to be RV. Recall that A is an indirect measure of risk-tolerance. The fact that larger values A increase the likelihood for an individual to be RV is consistent with the prediction of EUT. As shown in Figure 1 the lower the CRRA value the stronger the di¤erence A B , i.e. the stronger the risk-vulnerability. Note that if we substitute B for A in the regression reported in Table 5 , consistently B is the only signi…cant variable and has a negative sign. Note also that if the dependent variable is Exp.1 and Exp.2 instead of RV the only signi…cant variable is also A , and the estimated coe¢ cient of A is of the same sign. y Note containing author address and acknowledgements.
1 In fact, DARA is equivalent to vulnerability to sure losses, while properness and standarness are equivalent to vulnerability to background risks that reduce expected utility and increase expected marginal utility, respectively (see Gollier and Pratt, 1996) . Thus, DARA is necessary but not su¢ cient for risk vulnerability, while proper and standard risk aversion are su¢ cient but not necessary.
2 As observed by Quiggin (2003, pp. 610-611) : "The use of terminology such as 'standard'
and 'proper' in the expected-utility literature indicates the expectation that aversion to one risk will be enhanced in the presence of another, that is, that independent risks are substitutes rather than complements". This quotation suggests that risk vulnerability is "expected"(by EU modeler) to be a clear empirical fact.
3 An important special case of constant risk aversion is that of rank-dependent preferences with linear utility, namely Yaari (1987)'s dual theory (DT ). 4 A similar …eld experiment was carried out with farmers by Herberich & List (2012) . 5 Observe that theirs results from the unfair background risk treatment allows a test of DARA rather then a test of risk vulnerability (since the unfair background risk which they have chosen exhibits non-positive monetary outcomes only). 6 Observe that this additive background risk is equivalent to a multiplicative background risk e z = (0; 1 2 ; 2; 1 2 ) a¤ecting the blocked account. Formally, we have e x + e y = e x 1 2 x + 1 2 xe z. 7 The rational for this formulation is that examining the e¤ect of the introduction of background risk is equivalent to examining di¤erences between preferences represented by u and U . An agent exposed to background risk and having preferences represented by u would act as a non-exposed agent with preferences represented by U . Observe that the signs of the successive derivatives of u and U are identical. Thus, monotonicity, risk aversion, prudence, 12 The Kuhn-Tucker …rst-order conditions yield: A 8 > > > > > < > > > > > :
